mykevermin
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Or so we're told. I'm going for a coffee and to do some reading while Rome burns. Never did learn how to play a fiddle.
It's all about confidence, stupid. Every financial system depends on trust. People have to believe that the institutions they deal with (their "counterparties") will perform as expected. We are in a full-blown crisis because investors and financial managers—the people who run banks, investment banks, hedge funds, insurance companies—have lost that trust. Banks recoil from lending to each other; investors retreat. The ultimate horror is a financial panic; everyone wants to sell and no one wants to buy. Paulson's plan—still lacking essential details—aims to avoid that calamity.
As is well known, the crisis began with losses in the $1.3 trillion market for "subprime" mortgages, many of which were "securitized"—bundled into bonds and sold to investors. With all U.S. stocks and bonds worth about $50 trillion in 2007, the losses should have been manageable. They weren't, because no one knew how large the losses might become or which institutions held the suspect "subprime" securities. Moreover, many financial institutions were thinly capitalized. They depended on borrowed funds; losses could wipe out their modest capital.
So the crisis spread. AIG is a case in point. Although most of its businesses—insurance, aircraft leasing—were profitable, it had written "credit default swaps" (CDS) on some subprime mortgage securities. These contracts obligated AIG to cover other investors' losses. In 2008, AIG's mounting losses on its CDS contracts resulted in a downgrade last week of the company's credit rating and a need to post more collateral to its CDS "counterparties." AIG didn't have the cash.
Since August 2007, when the crisis first broke, the Fed has done three things to prevent eroding confidence from morphing into a self-fulfilling panic. The first was standard: cut interest rates. The overnight fed funds rate dropped from 5.25 percent to the present 2 percent. The aim was to promote lending and prop up the economy. By contrast, the second and third responses broke new ground.
If banks remained reluctant to make routine short-term loans—fearing the unknown risks—then the Fed would act aggressively as lender of last resort.
The program would be huge ("hundreds of billions," says Paulson) and could burden future taxpayers. To which Paulson has one powerful retort: It's better than the alternative of continued turmoil and possible panic. But that presumes that the program succeeds and raises the most unsettling question: If this fails, what—if anything—could the government do next?
A 0.25% tax on every stock, swap, derivative, or other trade would produce - in its first year - ~$150 billion in revenue. Wall Street would be generating the money to fund its own bailout.