Saddam Hussein, a mass murderer comparable to Göring, Frank and their companions convicted by American, Soviet, British, and French judges in Nürnberg in 1946, will stand trial before an Iraqi court, with, however, guidance taken from the Nürnberg tribunal.
This is hardly the first time that Washington has referred to the American defeat and occupation of Hitler's Germany after World War II as an inspiration for the American occupation of Iraq today. Ever since President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he has again and again looked to the German and Japanese occupation experiences as models, recalling that "...we lifted up the defeated nations of Japan and Germany and stood by them while they built representative governments." He has derided skeptics about the chances for democracy in Asia or the Middle East, observing that " the same doubts have [been voiced] at various times about Germans and Africans."
With his historical references, Bush has been reminding Americans how they defeated tyrants like Hitler and Saddam, liberating the tyrants' countries and purging their henchmen. Thereafter in Germany, his supporters recall, America introduced its values to replace the Nazis', democratized the country, embarked on a huge reconstruction program with the Marshall Plan, and presided over the introduction of a free market economy that brought unprecedented prosperity. The result was the establishment of the Federal Republic as a rock of democracy, stability, and peace in the middle of what had been a turbulent region, Central Europe. Likewise, they contend, a liberated Iraq of 2004 can become such a rock in the Middle East, a region just as unsettled.
The Bush administration has been using the story of the war against Hitler and the following occupation, causes which virtually all Americans of the 1940s backed wholeheartedly as noble and moral, to rally Americans of today to support an Iraq war which was justified by dubious arguments and manipulated intelligence reports and an occupation with which growing numbers in the United States are becoming disenchanted.
The supposed parallels between Germany of 1945-1946 and Iraq of 2003-2004 work for the Bush administration with the American public because they create an emotional bond between the infantrymen fighting guerillas in Iraq and their grandfathers of World War II. This was the "greatest generation" who stormed ashore in Normandy, struck across the Rhine, and moved on to the Elbe, a generation of heroes now passing away and soon to be honored by a huge World War II memorial currently being built near Bush's White House. American soldiers near Baghdad today compare themselves, the hazards they face and the stakes for America, to their grandfathers of World War II.
As the occupation of Iraq took a turn for the worse last summer, Bush's national security adviser Condoleeza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also invoked America's occupation of Germany -- this time as a way of urging Americans to give the administration time to carry out democratization and reconstruction in Iraq. They claimed that between 1945 and 1947 diehard SS "werewolves" kept on killing American occupation soldiers and German mayors who cooperated with them. Rumsfeld argued that things were getting better in Iraq now much more quickly than in Germany in the 1940s. It took until 1948, three years after the war, for a new currency to be established for Western Germany but only a few months until a new currency for postwar Iraq arrived, he explained; it took ten years to build a new German army but a new Iraqi army was already being recruited.
Historians ridicule such Germany-Iraq comparisons as absurd. They see them as either false (there is not a single documented case of an American soldier being murdered by bitter end SS men after Germany's capitulation) or invalid because political and social conditions in Germany fifty-five years ago and Iraq today vary greatly (Germany, to give just one example, was an ethnically homogeneous country, Iraq is deeply divided by religion and ethnicity among Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites). Iraq lacks both democratic traditions and political leaders who remained in the country during Saddam's rule and yet have some experience with democracy. Postwar Germany had at its disposal democratic traditions going back to 1848. Adenauer, Heuss, and most of the fathers of the Grundgesetz (the German constitution) had been active in the politics of the Weimar democracy and had weathered the twelve years of Nazi rule in inner exile at home.
Such objections miss the point for American history and politics. Bush and his administration have appropriated a historical memory now three generations old, transforming it into a myth that powerfully reinforces Americans' image of their country's mission abroad, which Bush has placed at the center of his foreign policy: to advance freedom, democracy, and peace everywhere, especially in the Middle East. Memory of the defeat and occupation of Hitler's Germany summons up a spirit of patriotic achievement of which Americans can be as proud today as they were proud in 1945.
Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), the great political scientist of power politics, saw in American foreign policy a fourfold pattern of beliefs: America as a model to the world, as a missionary, as a crusader, and as an imperial power with responsibilities all over the globe - primarily in Europe in two world wars and in a cold war, primarily in the Middle East and Southwest Asia now.
The history of the occupation of Germany and the cold war has lent great substance to that credo. While America often failed in efforts to introduce democracy in Latin America or Asia or, for reasons of Realpolitik, tolerated non-democratic practices there and elsewhere, Germany has been the biggest success story, a successful transplanting of the democratic values and political system which the United States cherishes.
It is that inspirational view of postwar Germany, together with the Federal Republic's faithfulness as a cold war ally, which have made it so hard for Bush's Washington to grasp why the government of Gerhard Schröder refused to join the U.S. in using military force to oust another evil dictator, Saddam, and mount a military occupation to do good in Iraq, as American occupiers once did in Germany so long ago.
Robert Gerald Livingston, current fellow at the German Historical Institute and former director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), writes from Washington, DC.