Gillers pointed to two cases in particular in which the federal courts rejected arguments that a judge's identity requires recusal, Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell and MacDraw, Inc. v. The CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc. In Blank, the judge rejected a suggestion that she should recuse herself because she was an African American woman who had worked on civil rights cases. In MacDraw, the judge rejected a motion to recuse himself, in part, because he was Asian American, and sanctioned the attorneys who made the motion.
Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell was a sex discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought in federal court in Manhattan. The defendants sought to recuse the judge in the case, Constance Baker Motley. Motley was the first African American woman ever appointed to the federal bench. The defendants argued in part that Motley should be disqualified from the case on the ground that she "strongly identifies with those who suffer discrimination in employment because of sex or race."
Motley denied the recusal motion, noting that (via Nexis), "if background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public service backgrounds."
http://mediamatters.org/blog/201008050037
I guess what matters is if you see sexual orientation on par with race or gender